Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation and Green Technology Innovation Based on Rank Dependent Expected Utility Theory


  • Liyu Zhao, Ke Yang, Xia Du, Junting Lou


Based on the theory of rank-dependent expected utility, the RDEU game model of government environmental regulation and enterprise green technology innovation is constructed. The existence of game Nash equilibrium solution under different emotional states is discussed. The influence of environmental regulation and green technology innovation participants' emotional factors on equilibrium solution is analyzed. The study finds that emotional factors have a significant impact on the game Nash equilibrium. The different attitudes of the two sides to the expectations affect the equilibrium of the mixed strategy through the expansion (or reduction) of the income index. When environmental regulation and green technology innovation participants have “optimistic” sentiment, the government tends to adopt an environmental regulation supervision strategy, and enterprises tend to implement green technology innovation strategies; when participants have “pessimistic” emotions, the government The environmental regulation and supervision strategy will tend to be stable, and the differentiation of green technology innovation capabilities among enterprises will be narrowed. Driven by emotional factors, participants will be influenced by the judgment of the other party to adopt a certain strategy. For example, when the probability that the government adopts the environmental regulation supervision strategy is lower than a certain demarcation point, the optimistic sentiment index increases.